The ultimatum issued by Donald Trump to Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz is not, as it is intended to be presented, a show of force. It is, rather, the clearest expression of a strategic frustration: the inability to translate military superiority into concrete political results.
After weeks of escalation, bombing and deployments, Washington faces an uncomfortable reality: It has won battles, but it has not achieved its central objectives. Iran has not conceded, the strait remains partially blocked and the risk of a broader regional war has only increased. In this context, the ultimatum appears as an increasingly desperate attempt to force a way out.
An ultimatum that contains a trap
The logic of the message is simple, but deeply problematic. If Iran does not yield, the United States will have to choose between two equally costly options: escalate the conflict or retreat.
Tehran has already made it clear that it is not going to give in. He did not do it under sanctions, he did not do it under diplomatic pressure and he will not do it now under direct threat. The idea that a public warning can change its behavior reveals a structural misunderstanding: Iran is not an actor that submits to external coercion.
The illusion of controlling the climb
The biggest risk of the ultimatum is that it forces Washington to act. If he does not carry out his threat—to bomb critical Iranian infrastructure—his credibility erodes. But if it does, escalation becomes virtually inevitable.
Iran would respond asymmetrically, targeting much more vulnerable infrastructure in the Gulf and Israel: power plants, desalination plants, critical energy nodes. In this area, the relationship of forces does not favor the United States or its allies: Iran needs fewer impacts to generate greater strategic damage.
Insufficient preparation, limited options
The ultimatum also exposes a deeper problem: the lack of strategic preparation for this scenario. For years, Washington underestimated Iran’s ability to turn the Strait of Hormuz into a global choke point.
Today, with hundreds of tankers blocked and traffic drastically reduced, that capacity has become evident. And there is no quick fix. Reopening the strait implies either a complex and prolonged military operation, or a negotiation with the Iranian regime that it sought to subdue. There is no third option.
Military movements and internal attrition: war also erodes US forces
Recent movements of US forces suggest that the Pentagon is aware of these limitations. The deployment towards Djibouti and the reinforcement of amphibious groups do not point to a large-scale invasion, but rather to the preparation of limited operations on two axes: the southern coast of Iran and the Yemeni front.
The goal appears to be to degrade Iranian coastal capabilities and contain the possible entry of the Houthis into the conflict. But even this narrower approach implicitly recognizes that the air campaign alone has not been enough.
Even more serious, strategic tensions are beginning to move within the armed forces themselves. As reported by the Huffington Post, some soldiers put it in direct terms: “We don’t want to die for Israel; we don’t want to be political pawns.” At the same time, conversations about conscientious objection and forms of dissent are increasing.
The same outlet notes that “interviews with active-duty soldiers, reservists, and military-focused advocacy groups revealed that some U.S. troops caught up in war are reporting vulnerability, overwhelming stress, frustration, and disillusionment to such a degree that they may leave the military.”
This discomfort does not arise in a vacuum. The war in Gaza has particularly impacted the younger sectors—who make up the core of the armed forces—making them more skeptical about the policy toward Israel. But, as the testimonies themselves also point out, the problem exceeds this conflict: “It is not just about Iran. Before this, there have been the deployments of the National Guard [en ciudades estadounidenses]the possibility of being used against their own neighbors and collaborating with ICE.”
Together, the neoconservative turn in foreign policy and the internal authoritarian agenda are generating increasing pressure on the military apparatus, not only in the relationship between political power and the leadership, but also in its internal cohesion.
The temptation of the “magic bullet”
In this context of stagnation, a classic risk arises in protracted wars: the search for a quick and decisive solution. The idea that a decisive blow—for example, against nuclear facilities or critical infrastructure—could change the course of the conflict.
The bombing of Natanz has already crossed a dangerous line. Iran interprets it not only as a military attack, but as an attempt to provoke a greater disaster. The response—including attacks on strategic Israeli targets—confirms that the logic of escalation is already underway.
The problem is that there is no “magic bullet.” Every attempt to hasten the end of the war increases the risk that it will expand and become uncontrollable.
Between the recognition of limits and flight forward
The ultimatum ultimately reveals America’s true position: it does not know how to end the war.
The administration is looking for a way out, but needs to show that it is not withdrawing without results. Military superiority has not been converted into effective strategic control, and recognizing that limit would have an internal political cost that is difficult for Donald Trump to absorb.
In this context, the risk is not only the prolongation of the war, but a drift towards increasingly extreme options. The temptation to seek a decisive blow—quick, forceful, irreversible—is beginning to gain ground in the circles of power.
Some signs in that direction have already appeared. The statement by Trump advisor David Sacks, suggesting that Israel could escalate the conflict even by considering nuclear options, coincides with a missile attack that hit a short distance from the Bushehr reactor. In turn, the American ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, when asked by CBS about the possibility of bombing an Iranian nuclear power plant, responded: “I would never rule out any option for the president.”
These statements do not constitute a decision, but they do show a climate: that of an escalation whose limits are beginning to become blurred. In this framework, an extreme exit can no longer be completely ruled out.
More than ever, avoiding that scenario becomes a central issue. Setting up an international movement against the war in Iran is not only an anti-imperialist and internationalist duty, but a necessity to stop an escalation with potentially catastrophic consequences.
Source: www.laizquierdadiario.com
