The Economist: US keeps Ukraine fighting with its hands tied

Hopes were high on September 13 that Ukraine might finally be allowed to use British and French Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles against targets inside Russia. Joe Biden and Sir Keir Starmer, the British prime minister, held two hours of talks at the White House, and many believed that the American president would finally grant his permission — necessary, some say, because the missiles may rely on targeting information from American satellites and other sources to evade Russian defenses, and some of them may contain American components.

However, after the meeting, the situation remained as uncertain as before. The American side only confirmed that the policy of restricting Western-supplied long-range systems to targets inside Ukraine had not changed. Vladimir Putin, clearly worried about an imminent change, has spent the last few days issuing bloodthirsty threats of retaliation to exploit Biden’s fears of escalation. The UK was singled out in particular: the Kremlin believes it is pushing for an end to the restrictions. Shortly before the White House meeting, Russia publicly announced that it had decided weeks earlier to expel six British diplomats for espionage, an accusation the British government called “completely unfounded.”

It was always unrealistic to expect a major statement after the meeting. A decision could come after Biden meets with Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, probably later this week (in Washington or at the annual UN General Assembly meeting in New York). Zelensky said on September 13 that he would present Biden with a “plan for victory” based on “interconnected solutions” that would give Ukraine enough leverage “to put this war on the path to peace.”

These solutions undoubtedly include the freedom to use Western missiles to strike military targets in Russia. Ukrainians are deeply angered by the fact that while Russia is waging a relentless campaign against Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure using air-dropped “glider bombs,” missiles and drones (some supplied by Iran and North Korea), Ukraine can only use its own drones and missiles to fight back.

It’s hard, Zelensky wrote on X (formerly Twitter), “to hear over and over again, ‘We’re working on it,’ while Putin continues to destroy our cities and towns.” Anyone who can see on a map where Russia locates its military installations and launches strikes “clearly understands why Ukraine needs long-range capabilities.”

Zelensky’s frustration is understandable. In international law, the right to self-defense allows strikes against positions from which an aggressor’s strikes are launched or enabled. “There is no moral or legal reason not to strike these targets,” said Ben Hodges, a former commander of U.S. forces in Europe.

The Biden administration has continually shifted its justifications for denying Ukraine permission to use long-range missiles, such as the U.S.-supplied ATACMS and Storm Shadow/SCALP ballistic missiles, against targets on Russian soil. In recent months, some officials have suggested that the administration does not want to jeopardize a future “reset” of relations with Moscow.

Other officials argue that allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS against targets in Russia would not change the strategic landscape, because there are not enough targets within range. Russia has moved most of its glide-bomb-dropping aircraft to airfields beyond the missile’s 300-kilometer (186-mile) range. Ideally, long-range strikes would be followed up by ground forces, which Ukraine cannot send deep into Russia. They also say the missile is a scarce and expensive asset that would be better used against targets in Crimea.

The notion that restraining missile use could improve future relations with Russia seems far-fetched. Putin has declared himself an enemy of the West and seeks the destruction of NATO. A “reset” would only be possible if Donald Trump wins the US presidential election in November and agrees to grant Putin most of what he wants.

The claim that there are too few targets within range of ATACMS to make a significant difference is disputed by the Institute for the Study of War, a think-tank. It has identified at least 230 targets, such as communications stations, logistics hubs and ammunition depots, that would be difficult for Russia to move but are currently out of range of Ukrainian missiles. It is true that there are a limited number of Storm Shadow/SCALP missiles, and neither the UK nor France have proposed reopening production lines. The US needs enough ATACMS for its current war plans, but there are too many of them (probably around 2,500): the missile entered service 30 years ago and is now being phased out by the US Army.

The real reason for Biden’s reluctance is almost certainly fear of Russian escalation. However, so many of Russia’s supposed red lines have already been crossed that Putin’s warnings have lost much of their power. The most recent came during Ukraine’s invasion of Russia’s Kursk province, when it used US-supplied GMLRS missiles against Russian bridges and troops. Putin himself has already claimed that Russia is fighting not just Ukraine, but NATO. Even if military targets in Russia were struck with NATO’s help, it would be hard for him to argue that anything fundamental had changed.

The US is exaggerating Putin’s threats, says Kurt Volker, a former US special representative for Ukraine. The threats are made “to dissuade us from taking action, and have no bearing on what he will actually do.” Russia is already bombing Ukrainian cities. Sabotage and cyberattacks against Ukraine’s allies would also be nothing new. Putin has other options for escalation; he could, for example, supply missiles to the Houthis in Yemen. At the extreme, the use of a tactical nuclear weapon can never be completely ruled out. But that would have dire consequences, and it is unclear why a change in US targeting policy would push him over that edge.

If Biden concedes after the meeting with Zelensky, there will probably be no public announcement. The decision could be communicated quietly to Kiev, to minimize its significance and keep it secret. It may be that only when targets in Russia are hit by Western missiles will the change be confirmed. For Ukraine, that cannot happen fast enough.

Via The Economist