Tech war: Chinese put US on alert in South China Sea

China’s cutting-edge electronic warfare (EG) capabilities are transforming the balance of power in the South China Sea, as demonstrated by a recent encounter between U.S. and Chinese forces.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported on China’s enhanced electronic warfare capabilities, shedding light on a December 2023 incident between a US EA-18 Growler electronic warfare aircraft and the Chinese Type 055 cruiser Nanchang in the disputed South China Sea.

SCMP claims that in December 2023, the US Navy fired William Coulter, commander of Electronic Attack Squadron 136 (VAQ-136), stationed on the USS Carl Vinson, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to command.

The report says that a month later, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recognized the Nanchang’s crew for their actions against a US aircraft carrier fleet. It also notes that Chinese media highlighted an encounter involving an EA-18G, believed to be from Coulter’s squadron, and the cruiser Nanchang.

The report mentions that PLA scientists recently revealed in a paper in the journal Radar & ECM that the AI-enhanced radar gave the Nanchang an edge over the EA-18G’s jamming capabilities.

He claims the Boeing-made EA-18G has been upgraded since 2021 for future warfare, but faces new challenges from the PLA-Navy (PLA-N)’s integrated radar systems and communications strategies.

The SCMP notes that these advancements allow PLA-N warships to form a “kill web” to counter EA-18G attacks. It also says that the Nanchang’s reported proactive tactics and successful engagement with US forces illustrate a shift in the PLA-N’s EW approach.

Much-improved Chinese EW capabilities, developed after then-Speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s controversial visit to Taiwan in August 2022, may have made such a feat possible.

SCMP noted that the PLA failed to track and surveil the US Air Force transport aircraft carrying Pelosi during her visit, despite deploying Type 055 cruisers and J-16D EW aircraft. The source says nearly all of the PLA’s EW equipment failed to function due to electronic jamming from Pelosi’s escort aircraft force.

Regarding Pelosi’s air escort, John Tkacik said in an August 2022 article for the Taipei Times that it could have been a massive force of U.S. F-15s that launched from Kadena Air Base in Japan, supported by the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group and the USS Tripoli with embarked F-35s stationed in the Philippine Sea.

From this experience, China may have improved its electronic warfare capabilities rapidly by investing in new technologies and placing them in a broader destruction network composed of kinetic and non-kinetic elements.

SCMP reported in February 2024 that Chinese scientists have invented a new class of EW equipment that can quickly detect, decode, and suppress enemy signals.

The new system, SCMP says, allows the PLA to seamlessly monitor signals in the gigahertz zone, encompassing frequencies used by amateur radio and even Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites.

He notes that the equipment includes innovative signal processing chips and AI integration, enhancing China’s ability to combat enemy blockade and maintain communication flow.

Furthermore, SCMP alleges that in encounters with US Navy ships carrying out EW activity, China has used electromagnetic emitting equipment, including high-powered phased array radars, to lock onto multiple targets, including US carrier-based aircraft.

In addition to developing new technologies, China may have already elevated electronic warfare to a strategic capability, integrating it into its multi-domain operations along with other kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities in a complex web of destruction.

In a May 2023 article for the Mitchell Institute, Heather Penney describes a kill web as multiple interconnected nodes that provide redundant paths to execute military operations, increasing the number and resilience of potential kill chains. A kill chain is the process required to identify and eliminate specific targets.

Penney says that unlike linear kill chains, which are easier to target and disrupt, kill webs provide a more adaptive and less predictable system, making it harder for adversaries to defeat them.

The Asia Times noted in April 2024 that the rebranding of China’s PLA Strategic Support Force (PLA-SSF) to PLA Information Support Force (PLA-ISF) highlights China’s strategic shift toward technology-driven “smart warfare.”

The PLA-ISF is designed to integrate emerging AI, quantum and other technologies into China’s multi-domain operational strategy against potential adversaries such as the U.S. and its allies. The rebranding reflects an evolution in Chinese military thinking, moving from “informatized warfare” to “intelligence warfare” that includes EW, cyber operations and signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Electronic warfare is also a key component of China’s Multi-Domain Precision Warfare (MDPW) concept, which uses AI and big data to identify and exploit weaknesses in US operational systems.

China’s MDPW seeks to dismantle and destroy US kill chains by targeting critical information nodes such as aircraft and satellites through physical attacks and information networks using electronic warfare and cyberattacks.

While the U.S. still has the edge in electronic warfare, near-peer adversaries like China and Russia may be closing the gap.

A November 2022 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) defense manual says the National Defense Strategy Commission mentioned that the US is losing its edge in electronic warfare, hampering its ability to conduct operations against capable adversaries.

Army Technology reported in May 2024 that the US spent $5 billion on electronic warfare capabilities in 2024, accounting for 45% of global electronic warfare spending from 2021 to 2023, compared to just 14% for Russia and 13% for China.

However, Army Technology says the US’s dominant position in the electronic warfare market is being challenged as the share of Russia, China and India is expected to increase over the next decade.

The report notes that over the past two decades, Russia has exploited perceived US complacency in electronic warfare strategies that have focused on counterinsurgency rather than non-state actors.

He notes that in Ukraine, Russia has used electronic warfare to disrupt adversary battlefield networks, support conventional assault forces through SIGINT and jamming attacks, and protect captured territories against counterattacks.

The source also mentions that Russia used electronic warfare to disrupt regional civilian services such as GPS and telecommunications.

Similarly, Army Technology mentions that China has mirrored Russia’s use of EW and equated the information domain with the electromagnetic domain. It says that in addition to shipborne EW equipment, China has installed this equipment and more at its occupied features in the South China Sea.

In line with this, Matthew Funaiole and other writers highlight in a December 2021 CSIS article China’s expansion of facilities on Hainan Island, Subi Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef, which now include satellite tracking, communications platforms, and systems potentially used in EW and SIGINT.

Funaiole and others note that these developments are intended to bolster the PLA’s ability to operate in contested electronic and cyber environments.

Via News Agencies