Israel’s Ultra-Orthodox Headache

Israel’s ultra-Orthodox Jewish minority, the Haredi, has fared well over the past quarter century.

Successive right-wing governments have given them access to power and money, a booming economy has meant the government has agreed to a lifetime of religious study for men in the community who want it, and a relatively relaxed security environment has allowed the ultra-Orthodox to reject calls to serve in the army, as other Israeli Jews are required to do.

But the Hamas massacre on October 7 changed all that.

Nine months later, the Haredim now find themselves the target of anger, not only from a broad swath of the public, but even from their traditional allies in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s religious-right coalition. Indeed, the current divisions over two pieces of Haredi-friendly legislation could even bring down the government.

The first bill — the so-called rabbis’ law — would have created hundreds of jobs for new municipal rabbis, whose salaries would be paid by the central government. In normal times, such a bill would probably have passed the Knesset without much fanfare — just another measure to funnel more public money to the ultra-Orthodox. But this time, amid complaints that the government had no business sponsoring such legislation during a costly war, there has been outrage even from rank-and-file lawmakers in Mr. Netanyahu’s Likud party.

The prime minister tried to quell the rebellion, but gave up last month when he realized the bill would not pass.

The second bill, meanwhile, has sparked even more opposition, as it would effectively legalize the draft exemption granted to young Haredi men. In this case, the initial rebellion was quelled, allowing the bill to pass the first of three readings it would need to become law. But angry lawmakers have vowed to oppose it unless substantial revisions are made.

Furthermore, following the recent ruling by the High Court of Justice that the army must begin conscripting ultra-Orthodox men, the bill may never reach its final reading anyway. While the court order did not explicitly state how many of the 63,000 men currently exempt should be drafted, Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara said it could initially be no fewer than 3,000. So the Netanyahu government is now faced with the impossible task of reconciling the ruling with the Haredi insistence on maintaining the exemption.

Normally, such a clash would be unexpected. When Netanyahu’s government was formed in 2022, the partnership between the center-right Likud, the far right and the ultra-Orthodox seemed firm. It wasn’t as if they agreed, but there was enough convergence of interests to ensure that each would have the support of the others on core issues.

The prime minister would get his judicial reform because his partners believed that a neutered High Court would save their own agendas from being overturned on constitutional grounds. The far right would have carte blanche to tighten Israel’s grip on the West Bank, to which the center-right and ultra-Orthodox had no objection. And the Haredim would get even more money, as well as continued exemption from conscription.

But to fully understand how much October 7 changed all that, one must first look back at the decades before, starting with the ultra-Orthodox themselves and their “learner society” — a term that refers to the idea that adult men should engage in Torah study rather than hold jobs or serve in the military. Today, only a little over half of Haredi men are in the workforce, compared with nearly 90 percent of non-Haredi Jewish men. And many of the ultra-Orthodox who do work have state-funded jobs of unclear economic value, such as municipal rabbis.

This “apprentice society” was made possible by a succession of right-wing governments that were prepared to provide financial support to yeshiva students in exchange for their political support of the Haredi. Israeli taxpayers should have rebelled against this quid pro quo, but for the past 20 years—up until October 7—they had merely gritted their teeth. The economy was booming, and the tax burden had been reduced, so the exemption from conscription never provoked more than occasional protests.

It was hard to cultivate broader opposition for the simple reason that — by Israel’s low threshold — the country was at peace. And because conscription and drafts into the reserves had been cut drastically, even if the burden was unequal, no one was particularly bothered — except the activists who challenged it in court, triggering years of legal wrangling.

But today’s military and economic challenges have changed the political dynamics. The war with Hamas — and the parallel war with Hezbollah in Lebanon — has led to the highest number of military deaths and casualties in years. But, exempt from military duty, the Haredi minority has been spared this suffering. Indeed, the part of the Israeli population hardest hit by all this is the national religious sector — Israelis who practice a more moderate form of Orthodoxy and serve in the military. They were once sympathetic to the ultra-Orthodox exemption, but no longer.

The other change is less existential but no less important. The war has forced the military to call up more reservists for longer periods than at any time in the past two generations. Men, and often women, have been cut off from their jobs, studies and families for weeks, even months at a time — a burden that the ultra-Orthodox do not share.

Their excuse that learning Torah is equivalent to military service because it provides divine protection for Israel was never taken seriously by the secular public, but now it provokes derision. And since the era of peace and prosperity for Israel is unlikely to return quickly, even after the war in Gaza ends — the same will be true for the free ride for the Haredim.

As Israel adjusts to a less secure national security environment, defense spending and military service are only expected to increase. Even if Hamas is defeated, the threat from Hezbollah and Iran has increased. And the thought that future challenges will not be shared by the estimated 13 percent of Israelis who are Haredi is no longer tolerable for most.

The heavier military burden is also likely to weigh on economic growth. Taxes and/or budget deficits will rise, more workdays will be lost to reserve duty, and business and consumer confidence will take time to recover. With the fiscal pie smaller than it was before October 7, competition for funding for schools, hospitals, roads and public transportation will also increase.

But the Haredi leadership seems incapable of dealing with this new reality. Its response to the Supreme Court’s decision was an uncompromising condemnation. And it seems that, cut off from the secular society around them, the community’s rabbis lack the tools or understanding to digest the change.

Via News Agencies