Chinese naval capabilities challenge global dominance in the Far East

“Considering its size, speed, phased array radar and other capabilities, this cruiser is without a doubt the most powerful surface combatant on the planet.”

While its carrier strike groups today are not yet of the same caliber as those of the U.S. Navy, the trend line is undeniable. In 2023, just 11 years after the first Chinese Navy Air Force fighter landed aboard the deck of its first aircraft carrier Liaoning, China’s second carrier, Shandong, was already conducting “live-fire engagement exercises” in the South China Sea. China’s carrier operations now include nighttime launches and recoveries, as well as blue-water operations in the mid-Pacific. The carriers have achieved an unprecedented number of at-sea periods, rivaling the days at sea of ​​any U.S. carrier in the Western Pacific over the past year.

In addition, China’s third aircraft carrier, the 80,000-ton Fujian, has completed docking tests and begun sea trials with operational readiness expected by 2025. Although conventionally powered, Fujian is equipped with three electromagnetic catapults that reflect China’s urgency to upgrade its carrier force. By skipping a generation of technology, steam catapults, the Chinese Navy appears to be on track to have at least six operational carrier strike groups by 2035—a force, even with inferior single carriers, that can dominate naval combat all the way to Guam in the near term and that lays the foundation for China’s goal of global naval power projection.

Declining State of U.S. Naval Strength

Interestingly, China’s commitment to developing its carrier and expeditionary strike groups comes at a time when Washington is questioning the effectiveness and future of large warships due to the proliferation of anti-carrier missile systems (ballistic, cruise and hypersonic) and the general disarray of the US shipbuilding industry.

The decrepit state of the U.S. shipbuilding industry was highlighted in April 2024 when the U.S. Navy announced massive cumulative delays of more than 11 years for key shipbuilding programs. The announcement came at a time when lawmakers and Pentagon planners agreed that the Navy needed to modernize and grow for a potential conflict in the Pacific.

Most notable in the April report—given the growing incompatibility between the two navies—were the delays in the U.S. submarine force. The first Columbia-class submarine is now projected to be 12 to 16 months behind schedule, and the fourth and fifth Virginia-class submarines are estimated to be up to 36 months behind schedule. Delays in the launch of existing and future U.S. Navy submarines are critical, as American defense planners have long believed that the Navy’s submarine force would be capable of dominating the undersea domain. Such capabilities are necessary to defeat the PLA Navy’s counter-intervention strategy focused on sinking the U.S. Navy’s large-deck aircraft carriers.

Facts and figures

China’s naval fleet size and weight are increasing

The downward trend in the size of the U.S. Navy force and shipbuilding infrastructure has been ongoing for decades. It has transformed the balance of military power in the Western Pacific and now reinforces the CCP’s regional and global expansionist goals.

Scenarios

Over the past decade, China has commissioned 161 major combatants, compared with 53 for the US. That trend is expected to continue. For example, while slightly lower than the annual average of 200,000 tons of warships and submarines launched and commissioned before the global pandemic, China’s total in 2023 was catching up, reaching about 170,000 tons, compared with 110,000 tons in 2022.

As such, the challenge for the U.S. and its allies is complex and evolving, and will not be solved in a single budget cycle or by election-year promises. The following scenarios are worth considering.

Likely: US asymmetric approach

Traditional World War II fleet expansion solutions are neither fiscally feasible nor physically sufficient to meet the challenge posed by China. A new approach that relies on the use of asymmetric weapons and networks is gaining recognition as the only solution that can be achieved in time to prepare for an expected Chinese “short and sharp war” to capture Taiwan that may occur within this “Decade of Concern” (2020-2030).

The likely asymmetric US approach was recently revealed by US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Sam Paparo, who outlined a new US strategy. The plan is designed to rapidly build and deploy thousands of new autonomous and unmanned systems that would invade the Taiwan Strait and keep China’s military occupied until more help can arrive.

Unlikely: American naval revitalization

Today, the size of the U.S. Navy (290 ships) is 30 ships smaller than its size before the passage of Congress’s first shipbuilding acts of 1938 and 1940. Known collectively as the “Two Ocean Navy Act,” Congressional leadership recognized before the outbreak of World War II that the U.S. Navy was weak and in need of immediate and drastic expansion.

Today, the Chinese Navy poses a similar threat to the US and its allies, and therefore requires a national naval modernization, with a special emphasis on the submarine industrial base, both for new construction and repair capacity. But, as noted above, traditional World War II solutions are not fiscally feasible, and therefore a broader naval revitalization and fleet expansion are unlikely.

Least likely: Continuation of the status quo

Given China’s dramatic shift in military power in the Western Pacific and its increasingly belligerent actions in the maritime domain around Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, there is now a growing consensus that its “peaceful rise” has been nothing more than political propaganda to freeze the US and its allies from taking necessary preparatory measures.

While there are still many in the US who promote the need for engagement with China, their voices have been diminished during the Trump administration and by Beijing’s subsequent aggressive actions under the Biden administration, such as the firing of ballistic missiles at Taiwan in August 2022, the use of water cannons against Filipino fishermen, or aggressive military actions against the US and its allies in Asia and Europe.

Via GIS