US and Chinese strategies for Latin America in the 21st century

Strategic documents reveal divergent power projects, with Washington reinforcing a security logic and Beijing proposing integration with the Global South

The almost simultaneous publication, in December 2025, of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America and the Third Document on China’s Policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean It reveals the moment of an accelerated systemic transition and an increasingly explicit dispute over the contours of the emerging international order. Although both documents are part of long-established strategic traditions, they express profoundly different power projects for Latin America.

On the one hand, the United States reaffirms a hierarchical, security and rival-containing hemispheric vision. On the other, China articulates a discourse of South–South cooperation, shared development and construction of a “community with a shared future”, inserting the region into an alternative vocabulary to that of the Western liberal order.

1. “America First” and the reactualization of imperial power

The US Security Strategy unambiguously states that Washington’s core interest is to “ensure that the Western Hemisphere remains reasonably stable and well governed to prevent and discourage mass migration to the United States,” ensure regional cooperation in combating drug trafficking and transnational crime, keep the hemisphere “free from hostile foreign incursion,” preserve control over critical supply chains, and ensure American access to strategic locations.

By announcing the intention to “affirm and enforce a ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine”, the document not only reaffirms an imperialist tradition that starts from this Doctrine, goes through the coups under the National Security Doctrine and culminates in Trump’s current policy.

Latin America, treated as a geostrategic zone to be stabilized, controlled and protected, under the allegation of “threats” related to migration, cartels, organized crime, governments considered hostile or inclined to approach rival powers, such as China. Hence the narrative that legitimizes presence, surveillance and, if necessary, interventionism.

Now, the lexicon of “America First”, aimed at recovering the status of “the strongest, richest, most powerful and successful country in the world”, implies reaffirming what they consider their “vital interests”. To this end, hemispheric priority is articulated with the notion that “the era of mass migration is over” and that border control has become a “primary element of national security”.

At the same time, the document rejects multilateralism and institutions that “dilute sovereignty”, reaffirming the centrality of the national state, North American, so to speak.

This defense of sovereignty, however, coexists with the assertion that the United States will not allow any other power to become dominant at a global or regional level. Nothing new on the front, as internal sovereignty has always coexisted with extraterritorial power, even if sometimes selectively emphasizing the “rules-based world order”.

In this way, the logic is essentially defensive and security-based, without Latin America having any relevance as a carrier of its own projects or as part of the continent’s integration.

As the United States expresses the core of the decline of the West discussed by Todd, it becomes possible to understand the North American strategic document as a symptom of a power whose ability to reproduce its material and symbolic foundations of hegemony is rapidly narrowing.

The radicalization of exceptionalism, the emphasis on MAGA and the re-updating of the Monroe Doctrine do not express self-confidence, but rather the strategic anguish of a center unable to sustain its leadership, while the loss of leadership in the productive sector and the fragility of social cohesion are evident. The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine is precisely the contemporary manifestation of this defensive and regressive logic.

2. China and its alternative globalization project

In contrast, the Chinese document has situated Latin America and the Caribbean as a constitutive part of the Global South and as a “relevant force to defend the peace and stability of the world and promote its development and prosperity”. The region is characterized as having a “glorious tradition of independence and self-strengthening through unity”, being considered “indispensable” to the process of multipolarization and the reconfiguration of contemporary globalization.

In this horizon, LAC appears not as an area of ​​contention, but as a necessary actor in a broader project of reforming global governance and building a multipolar order. It is no coincidence that the Chinese government reacted firmly to statements that revived the notion of the US “backyard”, reaffirming that no country should be reduced to the condition of a geopolitical appendage of hegemonic powers.

The normative axis of Chinese policy for the region is distinct and is anchored in four global initiatives (IDG, ISG, ICG and IGG) that synthesize the Chinese project of offering alternative international public goods to those of the West, combining development, security, civilizational dialogue and institutional reform.

The speech is anchored in the “common values ​​of humanity”, the idea of ​​an “independent foreign policy and peace” and the commitment to “universally beneficial and inclusive” globalization. The notion of a “community with a shared future of humanity”, central to contemporary Chinese diplomatic thought, is structured around the principles of equality, mutual benefits and openness.

In this sense, the BRI is located, as we highlighted in the book China and the New Silk Roadas an alternative globalization project to that led by the United States under the sign of neoliberalism and interventionism.

The document also emphasizes that China-LAC relations “are not directed against any third party”, even opening space for tripartite cooperation with extra-regional countries, as long as the projects are led by Latin American countries. Regional integration, through CELAC, is valued as an autonomous platform for bi-regional relations, in contrast to the North American practice of fragmenting the region according to specific strategic interests.

Recently, China proposed the Five Programs for the subcontinent (solidarity, development, civilizations, peace and peoples) that articulate high-level political agendas, infrastructural integration, technological cooperation, cultural exchanges, non-traditional security, combating poverty and strengthening state capabilities.

This framework dialogues with Chinese global initiatives, projecting in Latin America a model of engagement that combines economic pragmatism, cultural diplomacy and a narrative of mutual respect and shared gain.

It is clear that China has interests focused on opening markets, internationalizing companies, expanding its technological presence and competing for international spaces. However, the material and symbolic framework is completely different, focused on broad diplomatic consultations, expanding investments, carrying out major works, promoting trade and developing institutional cooperation in various areas.

In other words, despite the asymmetries, Sino-Latin American relations reveal relationship patterns that are radically different from those of the former colonial metropolises and imperialist powers.

Final words: Latin America in the face of systemic transition

The comparison between the documents reveals that the United States and China project profoundly divergent worldviews, material relations, order paradigms and legitimacy regimes onto Latin America. The exceptionalist strategy of the United States is part of the long-term geopolitics of hemispheric imperial tutelage, now coated with security urgencies and an imperial presumption without any pretense.

Chinese policy, in turn, places Latin America as a partner in the effort to reshape international governance, strengthen the Global South and promote regional development. Despite its own national interests and structural asymmetries, intrinsic to interstate relations, China opens up unprecedented possibilities for Latin American countries.

In other words, Latin America can convert the Chinese presence into a strategic opportunity, reinforcing its regional integration, diversifying partnerships, expanding its state capacity and formulating autonomous development projects. It should be noted, however, that given the US strategic priority and Trump’s policy, the risks are also increasing.

Diego Pautasso – Doctor (2010) and Master (2006) in Political Science and Graduate (2003) in Geography from UFRGS. He is a professor at the Military College of Porto Alegre, co-creator of the scientific dissemination project @fiosdechina (Instagram) and research director at the Brazil-China Center for Advanced Studies (CEBRACh).

Author of books Imperialism – does it still make sense in the Age of Globalization?; Current China in Mao Zedong’s Legacy; e China and Russia in the Post-Cold Waras well as co-author of China and the New Silk Road; International Relations Theory: Marxist contributions; and of Domenico Losurdo: critic of our time.

Email: [email protected]