Lula, Iran and the agreement that the US decided to discard; understand

Unpublished report brings out Lula’s outburst in 2010 on attempted international mediation in the Iranian nuclear program and reinforces distrust of US foreign policy

In 2010, then -President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva starred in one of the most ambitious episodes of Brazilian diplomacy: an attempt to intermediate an agreement between Iran and the United States about the Iranian nuclear program. Alongside Turkey, Brazil negotiated with the Tehran regime and even presented a proposal that, according to Lula, fully complied with the criteria established by the president of the United States at the time, Barack Obama.

The episode surfaced through an account of economist Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr., then executive director of the IMF in Washington. According to Nogueira, on an official visit to Brasilia that year, he heard directly from Lula an emotional outburst about the posture of the United States, who publicly disallowed the agreement through the then Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton.

“Lula was outraged. He said that President Obama was a kind of ‘moist mangabeira’ and could not trust his word,” recalls Nogueira. The expression alludes to the intellectual Mangabeira Unger, known for his sophisticated, but sometimes disconnected thinking of practical reality – a common criticism of American diplomacy.

According to the report, Lula not only was based on Obama’s letter to negotiate with Iran, but also tried to convince then President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to accept the terms of the agreement as a way to avoid harder international sanctions. “He used Cuba’s experience as an example and said, ‘Don’t underestimate the damage that prolonged sanctions can cause to a country,” Nogueira said.

The proposal, elaborated in conjunction with Turkey, provided for Iran to send part of its uranium enriched to Turkish territory in exchange for nuclear fuel for civil use.

The gesture aimed to build mutual confidence and make way for a broader deal. However, after the agreement of the pact, Hillary Clinton publicly rejected the plan, undermining the initiative and emptying Brazil’s role in the negotiation.

Days later, Obama’s letter mentioned by Lula was released, confirming that the terms proposed by Brazil and Türkiye were indeed aligned with what had been suggested by the United States – which increased diplomatic embarrassment.

More than ten years after, Nogueira has decided to make public the account because he considered that the lessons of that episode remain relevant, especially in the face of the new tensions involving the Iranian nuclear program.

Among the highlighted learning, he points out three: Brazil has capacity and legitimacy to act on large -scale international themes; President Lula has genuine skill and interest in playing this role; And the United States, in its assessment, demonstrates a history of inconsistency and lack of reliability in its diplomacy, especially when strategic interests are at stake.

The frustrated attempt at mediation of 2010 reveals not only the role Brazil aspirated played on the global scenario, but also the limits imposed by an international order marked by asymmetries of power.

The episode remains a milestone of active and haughty foreign policy that the country sought at that time-and a reminder that in the diplomacy arena, good faith is not always enough.