The steps of Carlos Mazón during the day of the DANA catastrophe last Tuesday, October 29, are the main key to unraveling what went wrong in the actions of the Generalitat Valenciana. All the sources consulted by this newspaper during this tragic week – whether from the PP, the Valencian Executive or various agencies involved in the response to the catastrophe – agree that Mazón arrived extremely late (around 7:30 p.m.) to the first meeting of the Center of Integrated Operational Coordination (Cecopi) in l’Eliana, epicenter of the emergency response. When it arrived, with a completely uncontrolled situation, it further delayed the development of Cecopi as the technicians had to explain the delicate situation to Mazón. Which, added to the lack of agility of his councilor Salomé Pradas, led to the alert being sent, already with Mazón in the Cecopi, at 8:12 p.m., when hundreds of people were already trapped or, directly, dead.
Before Mazón arrived at the L’Eliana Emergency Coordination Center, regional television At Punt had already broadcast live the brutal ravages of DANA. The Valencian president experienced the first signs of the disaster that was approaching in the Palau de la Generalitat. That Tuesday morning he had chained together three events outside of DANA without canceling his agenda at any time. The last, with employers and unions, to address the budgets for next 2025.
What’s more, after the last event with the employers’ association and the unions, which ended at 2:30 p.m., the president left the Palau for a private meal, as elDiario.es has learned. Such was the lack of concern of the head of the Consell at those hours that he did not connect to the 5:00 p.m. Cecopi, not even by videoconference, as other institutions did. Where was the president between 2:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. when he received a call from Minister Pradas warning of the risk of the Forata dam overflowing?
A PP source maintains that Mazón’s team thought that DANA “would cause some flooding, as is usual in Valencia, but without importance.” “Until it was irremediable, they did not become aware of the seriousness of the situation, there was nothing to do, they sent the alert out of desperation,” states the same source, which emphasizes a relevant aspect to understand Carlos’s actions. Mazón and his team: “Just trust [José Manuel] Cuenca and Cayetano [García Ramírez]who are two people incapable of managing the Administration,” he recalls in reference, respectively, to the regional secretary of the President’s Cabinet and the regional secretary of the Presidency, two senior officials who have been side by side all week with the head of the Consell, in a kind of bunkerized ‘politburo’.
The Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas, had called the Cecopi meeting for 5:00 p.m. around 3:00 p.m. However, a source involved in the operation—permanently scandalized since last Tuesday—considers that, taking into account the signs of the impending disaster, “it should have been called for 3:00 p.m.” at the latest.
Sources consulted by this newspaper, belonging to one of the agencies participating in the response to the tragedy, assure that the Cecopi was convened “late in the evening”, in light of the extreme seriousness of the situation, which had already seriously escalated during midday and even before. . Despite the signs, Mazón left the Palau de la Generalitat and went to an event of the Ministry of Health on the other side of the city.
A source from the Valencian Executive confirms that Pradas, very overwhelmed and blocked, dedicated herself to entering and leaving the Cecopi room while trying to contact Mazón by telephone. “The counselor didn’t know what to do,” recalls the same source.
In the agencies involved in the response to the catastrophe, numerous sources report the chaos and lack of coordination that has reigned in the Cecopi every day. And, especially, on the first afternoon of last Tuesday. Until 5:00 p.m., according to sources from the regional Executive, all the detailed information was not yet known at Cecopi. Several of the officials involved in the emergency response connected to the meeting electronically. Not so Mazón, who remained in the Palau de la Generalitat.
A source present at the Cecopi meeting assures that, around 6:45 p.m., the councilor contacted Mazón by telephone to inform him of the risk of overflowing the Forata dam. Only at that moment, the president left the Palau de la Generalitat in the direction of the L’Eliana Emergency Coordination Center.
Official sources from the Presidency of the Generalitat assure that Mazón was “working and informed punctually.” “It is when he is informed of the risk of the Forata dam breaking that he physically and immediately joins the Cecopi meeting,” add the same sources. In fact, it leaves by car from the Palau – in the center of València – to l’Eliana, about 20 kilometers away.
Presidency dumps on Minister Pradas the responsibility of managing the crisis: “She was directing the Cecopi, convened from 3:00 p.m., as established by regional law.”
The president’s late arrival slowed down decision-making even more, despite the fact that Salomé Pradas had been in charge of Cecopi for hours. “Mazón arrived and slowed down everything because the technicians had to explain it to him again,” says a source familiar with the insides of that catastrophic first Cecopi. “It cannot be that politicians took the lead,” adds the same source in reference to Mazón and the Minister of Justice and Interior, Salomé Pradas.
A source involved in the deployment from the first minute also doubts the capacity of the Generalitat Valenciana Emergency team: “They are very lazy and not prepared.” These are the senior officials who replaced the previous team of Vox councilor Elisa Núñez. With the distribution of powers in the first Executive of Mazón and his far-right partners, the management of the Emergencies fell to a party well known for its climate denialism and much more interested in the regional competition of bullfighting celebrations, the world of that the former bullfighter and then Valencian vice president, Vicente Barrera, came from.
After the departure of Santiago Abascal’s party from the Valencian Executive, Salomé Pradas assumed the powers of Justice and Interior. In fact, as reported by elDiario.es, the minister had the position of general director of the Interior vacant for three months, with delegated functions in matters such as Civil Protection or the regional Police, transcendental powers in the response to any emergency.
Mazón personally chose the candidate to fill the position, appointed by decree a few hours before the catastrophe: the bullfighting expert Vicente Huet, with a curricular career limited to his work experience in a company in the sustainable packaging sector and to municipal politics in the PP. (He was mayor of Barxeta and chief of staff of the president of the Provincial Council of Valencia, the popular Vicente Mompó). The priority imposed on the new general director was the bullfighting celebrations, a fishing ground for votes in dispute between the right and the extreme right.
The capacity of Minister Pradas
Among the popular Valencians, almost no one supports Mazón’s management, who has become a kind of political ‘zombie’. Even less to Salomé Pradas. Numerous officials or former officials of the party put the president and the councilor down, privately and without mercy. There are also thunderous silences.
A PP source states bluntly in reference to the department headed by Salomé Pradas: “I don’t think any senior official in that department was qualified to manage the emergency, it has surpassed them.” The same source assures that the capacity of the head counselor for the response to Emergencies is “limited.” “It has been seen that it is too big for him,” he adds.
Councilor Pradas had to face the initial management and decision-making alone while Mazón went to Cecopi despite the fact that “she has no experience in management,” they remember.
The blunder in the response to the catastrophe paints an extremely complicated picture for the popular Valencians. Their leader is already synonymous with incompetence.
Source: www.eldiario.es
