Does China support or fear a war between Iran and Israel?

Article from the famous magazine The Economist answers: what is China’s true position in the conflict between Iran and Israel?

Last month, as tensions rose between Iran and Israel, China hosted a Chinese film festival in the Iranian capital, Tehran. The event started with a blockbuster: “The Battle at Lake Changjin”. The drama portrays the heroism of Chinese soldiers who fought against American troops during the Korean War between 1950 and 1953. “Give one blow to avoid a hundred,” says Mao Zedong when encouraging his colleagues in the film. Nationalist bloggers in China celebrated the film’s screening. “Iran cannot sit idly by, even if the United States is behind Israel!” wrote one influential commentator.

As Chinese officials analyze violence in the Middle East since then, they may be less interested in an escalation. On October 1, Iran launched a series of missiles at Israel. Israel has relentlessly attacked Iranian allies in Gaza and Lebanon. All of this worries China, which is, by far, the most powerful of the four countries—Iran, North Korea and Russia as well—that have received nicknames in the West, such as the “axis of turbulence” and the “chaos quartet”. The four share a contempt for the US-led global order and are willing to destabilize it. Security relationships between them are usually confidential. However, despite China’s shows of force around Taiwan (see next article), there are limits to its appetite for conflict.

China’s relationship with Iran illustrates this dilemma. Leaders in Beijing are very sympathetic to the Iranian worldview. Last year, Iran was accepted as a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organizationa security and economics club dominated by China and Russia. In January, Iran was admitted to the BRICSanother group that China and Russia are trying to strengthen as a bastion of skeptics towards the West.

China also benefits from abundant Iranian oil supplies. The volume of this trade is difficult to quantify due to the elaborate schemes that China and Iran use to evade American sanctions. But estimates indicate that it represents 10 to 15% of China’s crude oil imports, making up the majority of Iran’s crude oil exports.

As the world’s biggest buyer of foreign oil, China worries about the potential impact of a wider war in the Middle East on the flow and cost of the product. Iran sells its oil at low prices. An Israeli attack on Iranian oil facilities could force China to rely more on other, more expensive suppliers such as Saudi Arabia. However, Saudi shipments could be disrupted in the Strait of Hormuz or the Red Sea by missile attacks from Iran or the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

This may not be disastrous for China. It is estimated that the country has reserves that would cover three to four months of lost imports. Furthermore, oil accounts for 18% of China’s energy mix, compared to 34% in the United States. However, a major war could also threaten Chinese commercial interests in the Middle East. China has invested billions of dollars in energy and infrastructure projects, especially in Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Israel is also a recipient of Chinese investments, despite China’s support for the Palestinian cause.

China sees American power waning in the Middle East and sees an opportunity. It has forged close ties with Iran, but also with Saudi Arabia and other rivals of Iran. Beijing describes its large investments in the region as part of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure construction scheme aimed at increasing Chinese trade and influence. The BRI’s apolitical approach helps project China’s image as a hands-off power, something it seeks to foster in the global south, seen as a counterweight to the United States.

But with the Middle East threatening to descend into a wider conflict, with Iran—a key ally of China—at the center of it, Beijing’s diplomatic impotence in the region risks being exposed. China has tried to demonstrate the opposite. In March last year, he mediated the final stages of an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore their diplomatic relations, which had been severed for years. In July, rival Palestinian factions Fatah and Hamas announced a vague agreement in Beijing to cooperate in forming a new government for the Palestinians after the end of the war in Gaza.

However, these initiatives were unable to stop the violence. Israel rejected the “Beijing Declaration”, stating that it does not want Hamas involved in the Palestinian territories. Iran’s dependence on China as a buyer of its oil could give Beijing some leverage over the Islamic Republic. But China appears to see greater benefits in American involvement in Middle East conflicts than in trying to contain Iran. China may consider that a United States distracted by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East would be less willing to confront Beijing over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

This does not mean that China is eager to escalate tensions. Security ties between China and Iran are limited. A report published this month by Carnegie Endowment for International Peacea Washington think-tank, mentions rumors that China has provided satellite technology to Iran’s ballistic missile program. However, a deal signed in 2021 has produced little military cooperation beyond a few joint exercises, considered insignificant by Western analysts of intelligence. Although the deal promised $400 billion in Chinese investment over 25 years, China has shown no enthusiasm for investing in Iran.

For China, the other two members of the quartet are more vital concerns. Russia and North Korea border China and serve as barriers against American influence. Even with these countries, China does not offer unrestricted support. It provides major technological support to Russian defense industries but appears to avoid supplying weapons for use in Ukraine, despite describing its partnership with Russia as limitless. China has made clear its opposition to Russia’s threatened use of nuclear weapons in the conflict.

In relation to North Korea, China did not prevent the country’s development of nuclear weapons, but was visibly upset with the movement. Beijing may also have viewed the agreement, which resembles a defense treaty, signed between North Korea and Russia in June with suspicion. With Russia in the game, China risks losing some of its influence over North Korea.

China sees all of its authoritarian allies as useful in discomfiting the United States. However, it treats these countries with caution, showing less willingness to take risks compared to the other members of the quartet. In the Middle East, it does not want to get involved in a complex fight. If the conflict between Israel and Iran does escalate, leaders in Beijing are likely to remain watching from afar, hoping that Chinese interests survive the conflict.