On July 21, Joe Biden withdrew his candidacy, which profoundly changed the course of the US presidential elections. The attack on Donald Trump (July 13) is no longer a new fact. What is new is the nomination of Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic Party candidate.
In the digital temporality that conditions contemporary life, everything becomes obsolete very quickly. The ability to master the news updates is fundamental in political disputes. Today, the new thing is Harris and Trump’s candidacy is on the defensive.
It is important to discuss the US elections in light of the global struggle against the far right. Indeed, the strengthening of these radical groups can be observed in several countries around the world, which naturally invites scholars to engage in comparative analysis. However, the similarities between the political scenarios of these different countries should not overshadow their particularities.
Often, coping strategies that work in one country are ineffective elsewhere.
Let’s start with the US itself.
Electoral polls already show Harris ahead of Donald Trump, something Joe Biden has not achieved at any point in this electoral journey. In the US, therefore, the nomination of a black woman and descendant of immigrants seems to be something promising in confronting the white, male, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant identity politics embodied by Donald Trump.
The history of the United States has been marked by racial conflict in a very peculiar way for some time now. There, racism took the form of an institutionalized apartheid that denied civil rights to black people. The regime was only legally abolished in the mid-1960s, after a major movement by the black population in defense of civil rights. This culture of mobilization remains vibrant in the United States, as demonstrated by the strength of the popular movements led by the Black Lives Matter movement, founded in 2013.
Much of Donald Trump’s popularity can be explained as a kind of reaction from these white social groups, still unhappy with the Civil Rights Act (1964). Experts in American politics use the term “White Trash” to define part of Trump’s social base, made up of white people of low social status, such as factory workers, rural workers and the poor in general.
In the US, therefore, identity markers have great appeal, on the left and the right. There is little doubt that Kamala Harris is better placed to lead the reaction to Trumpism than the tired and fragile Joe Biden.
In France, Portugal and Germany, identity aspects are also important, but with very different contours compared to the USA.
The National Rally Party, led by Marine Le Pen, is also the result of an identitarian reaction against immigrants and an alleged attack on the “French national essence”. In Portugal and Germany, respectively, “Chega” and “Alternative for Germany” are also based on a certain far-right identitarianism against immigration, especially Islamic immigration.
The French, Portuguese and German far-right are primarily focused on groups considered “invaders”, that is, immigrants, especially Muslims.
In Spain, the situation is different, as Catalan separatism is the main issue mobilized by Vox, the far-right party led by Santiago Abascal. Although it also has an Islamophobic component, the identity aspect is not at the forefront of the causes that explain the strengthening of the Spanish far-right.
In Argentina, Javir Milei’s victory was driven by a dramatic economic crisis that has been dragging on for decades. The racial element has very little importance in understanding Milei’s populism.
It’s in Brazil?
The American racial debate has had a great influence on the Brazilian Black Movement for some time now, which can help to understand the difficulties in developing an anti-racist discourse that is more suited to the specificities of racism that we have here.
It is therefore to be expected that what is happening in the US will have the potential to colonize the Brazilian identity-based left. As soon as Biden withdrew his candidacy, several left-wing leaders expressed excitement at the possibility of a “black woman” defeating Trump in the US, suggesting that Brazil should follow a similar path. But we must be careful with our emotions, as the comparison between Brazil and the US has very narrow limits.
First, it is important to highlight that there has never been institutionalized apartheid in Brazil, and widespread miscegenation has made racial boundaries less obvious. We also do not have a history of large-scale popular movements driven by racial identity. This does not mean, of course, that Brazilian racism is milder than racism as it manifests itself in the United States, as has been said countless times in the history of Brazilian social thought. These are distinct experiences, and it is clear that, among us, the discourse of identity does not have the same capacity for mobilization, despite being strong in universities and in some left-wing parties and social movements.
The identity component is also not the most important aspect in the growth of the Brazilian far-right, led by Jair Bolsonaro. The erosion of the political system driven by the media spectacularization promoted by Operation Lava Jato, the collapse of public security and the popularity of neo-Pentecostal evangelical churches are much more relevant elements.
It is not reasonable to assume that in 2026, the Brazilian democratic field will have to imitate the solution invented by the Democratic Party. The desirable success of Kamala Harris in the US elections says more about the specificities of the democratic crisis experienced in that country than it signals a universal model that can be applied in other regions of the world.
By Rodrigo Perez, professor and researcher of History at UFBA.
Source: https://www.ocafezinho.com/2024/07/27/rodrigo-perez-o-efeito-kamala-harris-no-debate-politico-brasileiro/
